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This paper aims to study the effects of interest on reserves (IOR) on banks’ behavior in a theoretical framework.

This paper introduces IOR into both Cooper and Ross (1998) and Cooper and Ross (2002) and conducts quantitative analysis. It thoroughly examines the effects of IOR on banks’ resource allocation decisions under different assumptions.

In the model without deposit insurance, the results of this paper show that paying IOR facilitates the bank to use the run-proof contract. When the run-admitting contract is adopted, there is a set of conditions under which the bank is indifferent between holding illiquid asset and excess liquid reserves. In the model with deposit insurance, the results show that if the riskless illiquid investment is profitable and available, then paying IOR can hardly influence the bank's resource allocation. If the riskless illiquid investment is limited, then a certain level of IOR could fulfill some monetary targets.

Little research has combined IOR and model of bank runs. It helps to extend the theoretical analysis in this perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to give autistic employees a voice, evaluate their work-based experiences and to disseminate the relevant recommendations of the Westminster AchieveAbility Commission report.

These experiences were identified through a questionnaire answered by 600 neurodivergent employees, including 95 autistic respondents. This allowed us to compare experiences across neurodivergent categories.

The overwhelmingly negative work-place experience is consistent at every stage unless managers had a good understanding of neurodivergence. This deteriorated further the more categories of neurodivergence identified with, and minority ethnicity. Few reasonable adjustments were made. Psychometric tests are experienced as disabling. No statistically significant differences were found between genders.

The target group are not representative of the wider autistic population and the sample is relatively small. Further research could look at how managers come to understand neurodivergence, the utilisation of reasonable adjustments and how to promote neurodivergence awareness.

There need to be wholesale changes in recruitment and reasonable adjustments in the workplace, which will require substantial changes in attitudes.

The experience of neurodivergent people in the work-place, including autistic employees, was more consistently negative than expected. It was difficult to find any autistic employees without disabling experiences. This paper hopes this will alert wider society to the issues and may serve to support more solidarity amongst neurodivergent people in relation to employment. The findings have already influenced The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service.

There is very little detailed research focussed on the work-place experience and voices of autistic employees and less research that considers the implications of neurodivergent overlaps in the workplace.

We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the United States, Australia, and eight Asian countries) at heterogeneous economic development stages and different regulatory environments. We document that corporate pensions are significantly underfunded in most countries of our sample in the period of 2001–2017, when interest rates were ultralow in most countries. In addition, firms from countries with stronger employee protection and more generous retirement benefits tend to show higher levels of underfunding in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. To the extent of pension underfunding imposing constraints on corporate investment, we find that firms in these countries can face more constraints on investment when their pension is underfunded.

Group incentive schemes have been shown to be positively associated with firm performance but it remains an open question whether this association can be explained by the motivating characteristics of the group-incentive scheme itself, or if this is due to factors that tend to accompany group-incentive schemes. We use a controlled experiment to directly test if group-incentive schemes can motivate sustained individual effort in the absence of rules, norms, and institutions that are known to mitigate free-riding behavior.

We use a controlled lab experiment that randomly assigns subjects to one of three compensation contracts used to incentivize an onerous effort task. Two of the compensation contracts are group-incentive schemes where subjects have an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of their coworkers, and the third (control) is a flat-wage contract.

We find that both group-incentive schemes resulted in sustained, higher performance relative to the flat-wage compensation contract. Further, we do not find evidence of free-riding behavior under the two group-incentive schemes.

Although we do find sustained cooperation/performance over the three work periods of our experiment under the group-incentive schemes, further testing would be required to evaluate whether group-incentive schemes can sustain cooperation over a longer time horizon without complementary norms, policies, or institutions that mitigate free-riding.

By unambiguously showing that group-incentive schemes can, by themselves, motivate workers to provide sustained levels of effort, this suggests that the “1/n problem” may be, in part, an artifact of the rational-actor modeling conventions.

Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53 requires that the audit be designed to provide a reasonable assurance of detecting management fraud. Traditionally auditors have utilized personal, business, and economic red flags in risk analysis and audit planning. Touche Ross (1974), Coopers and Lybrand (1977), Price Waterhouse (1985), and SAS Nos. 6, 16, 17, and 53 discuss various red flags associated with management fraud. However, the authoritative literature does not provide any guidance on how to measure and combine red flags. The extant literature primarily measures red flags as “yes” or “no” type binary variables. However, red flags are fuzzy in nature and fuzzy set approach can be used to measure and combine red flags. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for the application of the theory of fuzzy sets to the problem of assessing the risk of management fraud using red flags. This approach can be used to capture the beliefs of one or several auditors concerning red flags and combine these beliefs to estimate the risk of management fraud. This approach can be extended to build fuzzy reasoning systems that assess the risk of management fraud.

Information is often regarded as a nation's most valuable resource. The management of this resource at a national level presupposes the existence of a coherent national information policy. This article deals with attempts to develop such a policy for information services in Ireland during the 1970s and outlines the present approach of encouraging technological change, in the form of new information technology applications, to determine the character and extent of national information related developments in Ireland.

We present an overview of research on spillover effects within firms and introduce a classification of the literature. We divide spillovers into either technological or social in nature. In our classification, a technological spillover is one in which an agent rationally responds to a cue in the workplace that does not rely on the identity or characteristics of a coworker. Social spillovers, on the other hand, may be thought of as arising from the social preferences of an individual or social norms established in the organization.

This case study aims to develop and empirically test a general framework for the implementation and evaluation of a warranty policy (i.e. implementation, support structure, and evaluation stages) within the context of a high‐tech global firm.

The sample consisted of the employees of an anonymous US‐based global high tech firm.

The findings for the implementation stage report that the cost and profit centers should have their costs allocated on the basis of activity. For the support structure, there is a negative response to outsourcing as an option for implementing the warranty policy. For the evaluation, findings report that US firms should reevaluate their pricing, quality, and warranty strategy for domestic and international markets.

This case study can be expanded by examining how companies balance the cost/quality/warranty ability of the product, the techniques used to allocate warranty costs, and to evaluate multiple companies/industries, perhaps with a longitudinal focus.

Findings report that the budgeted costs should be allocated depending on the type of incident. The majority of outsourcing opponents consisted of service personnel while those in favor were from product marketing departments. Also, the US firms need to provide written warranty information to their customers.

The proposed framework will satisfy a current, critical need to provide guidelines for the steps needed to implement and evaluate a warranty policy within a context of a high tech global company. Additionally, this case research study's key contribution lies in its attempt to address warranty management processes within a multitude of a firm's departments. Furthermore, the anonymous high tech company used in this study was chosen as a sample because the company offered a wide range of products, warranties, and service options. The company also utilized a vast reseller base to sell and service its products. This method offered the potential to gain better insight with regards to the role of resellers in a warranty program. It also marketed products and services to six specific industries: financial, retail, transportation, manufacturing, communications, and the public. This broad industrial perspective gave the study added cross‐industries' insight in reference to implementation and evaluation of a good warranty policy since the anonymous high tech company considers these industries to be sustainable industries in the USA and abroad.

Research on gender and finance finds that women chief executive officers (CEOs) are relatively risk-averse and more ethical than their male counterparts. These differences are often presented as reasons for lower earnings management by firms led by women. A strand of contrasting literature however finds the notions of women being risk-averse and ethical not necessarily true for women occupying top leadership positions as women successful in shattering the glass ceiling adopt behaviors like men. This study attempts to understand the differences between the ethical tendencies of the two genders by examining if CEO power impacts the relation between CEO gender and earnings management.

The authors begin the analysis using standard regressions using the propensity score matched (PSM) samples and examine if CEO power mediates or amplifies relationship between CEO gender and earnings management. The authors use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression approach and instrumental variables (IV) estimation to address the endogeneity concerns.

This study’s results suggest that the relationship between CEO gender and earnings management is mediated by CEO power. The authors find that women CEOs with lower power engage in lower earnings management. However, women CEOs with more power tend to engage in greater levels of earnings management than their male counterparts.

This study contributes the finance literature by showing women leaders successful in occupying top leadership positions are not necessarily more risk averse and more ethical. Less powerful women CEOs are subjected to potentially higher levels of scrutiny and are forced into an environment where they have to be seen as ethical. However, powerful women face the same concerns as their male counterparts and not necessarily more ethical.

While start‐up firms create a substantial economic impact on most economies, the failure rate of start‐up firms seems to remain high over time. Few authors have examined the influence of intellectual capital management on business performance, and when it has been examined, the focus has been on large, mature and public companies. The purpose of this study is to analyze the extent to which IC assets are associated with new firm survival and growth. Results from this study suggest that the human capital of the entrepreneur (i.e. education, business experience and level of motivation), organizational capital (i.e. firm capacity to adapt quickly to changes and the ability to implement successful strategies), and relational capital (i.e. development of productive business networks and an immediate access to critical stakeholders) are important intangible assets, which seem to be related positively to venture performance.